If You Know What You Do, You Can Stop Doing It

“Inhibition” is a term with a long history in the sciences of the mind and, as often happens, it was borrowed from folk psychology and moral discourse at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Interestingly, it played a key role in consolidating modern neurology as a crossroads between psychology and physiology.

Within the philosophical and social—and therefore moral—context from which twentieth-century science emerged, inhibition referred to the process of restraining or suppressing an existing possibility of behavior, thought, or response as part of a mechanism of control, usually in education and socialization. This control was attributed to the power of the will over “lower” drives and functions and was thus seen as a sign of culture, morality, and a mature personality.

This notion persists in many aspects of contemporary society. A typical example is the child who learns to control their sphincters or to eliminate a particular behavior, either independently or as a result of adult imposition. In this sense, inhibition is associated with hierarchy: a higher level exerts power over and conditions the expression of a lower level.

With the development of the science of mind, the role of this higher level—formerly social—was increasingly attributed to the nervous system. Correspondingly, the structure of the nervous system came to be viewed as hierarchical. Alongside this view, another concept emerged: parallel inhibition, in which two possibilities (or systems) compete, and the activation of one excludes the expression of the other. This option will be considered later.

The phenomenon of inhibition, and its use as an explanatory concept, is now widespread in neuroscience, cognitive science, and theories of learning and memory. In neuroscience, inhibition is crucial for understanding regulation in the central nervous system, as excitation alone cannot account for it. Inhibition occurs when neurons suppress the activity of other neurons by releasing inhibitory neurotransmitters (such as GABA and glycine), thereby reducing the likelihood of triggering an action potential.

Neural inhibition is commonly categorized according to its location in the neural network: synaptic, presynaptic, postsynaptic, recurrent, or lateral. In addition, disinhibition refers to the inhibition of inhibitory neurons, effectively “releasing” a previously suppressed neuron or network and allowing it to become more active.

These inhibitory mechanisms are essential for:

From these points, it becomes clear that inhibitory mechanisms are crucial for learning new skills, as they underlie the ability to exclude certain stimuli and actions, thereby creating choice and adaptability. Common sense suggests that knowing what not to do is as important as knowing what to do, and that adaptation often depends on distinguishing between these two possibilities.

At the same time, it is essential to distinguish between unconscious, automatic inhibitory mechanisms and those associated with higher brain structures and volition. The latter belong to the realm of social inhibition: the individual’s ability to modify conduct by overriding a reflex, habit, or tendency through personal choice, social pressure, or a combination of both. This distinction—between volitional (cortical) inhibition and neural inhibition—is crucial for understanding the uniqueness of Feldenkrais’s approach.

In Body and Mature Behavior, Feldenkrais presents the neurological foundations of his method alongside its practical implications. The book is deeply embedded in the psychology and physiology of its time and addresses many of the questions raised by Smith’s analysis, drawing on prominent early twentieth-century research.

Feldenkrais aimed to establish the conditions for behavioral change and heightened awareness, claiming that such change would be impossible without improving motor learning. This radical embodiment—introduced at the outset and developed throughout the book—is structured around several key claims:

In analyzing the neurological dynamics of learning, Feldenkrais draws on Pavlov’s theory of conditioned reflexes and established learning principles, yet his interpretation is distinctive. He concludes:

“Pavlov’s work has proved, for the involuntary innervations, that the part tends to reinstate the total situation, and that psychologists knew this to be the case for voluntary innervations… for every sensory-motor vegetative functioning, the whole situation is reinstated in certain conditions at the appearance of any part of it” (p. 48).

This insight underlies the concepts of integration and differentiation: any unit of behavior is always embedded in a broader whole. Consequently, rational understanding and conscious correction do not prevent a suppressed pattern from reappearing when one of its components is activated. This is true even for something as seemingly simple as posture.

According to Feldenkrais, a poorly organized body is one in which:

“Unused parts grow weak and become atrophied; other parts bear a correspondingly heavier burden and are overworked. Fatigued motor cells become inhibitory nuclei, and a whole series of acts become excluded and impossible” (p. 118).

To reach balance and maturity, one must improve the ability to act and sense through doing, since choice and adaptability depend on a tonically erect state that offers equal opportunity for all actions and muscular combinations.

This improvement is achieved by changing the relationship between excitation and inhibition in the cortex: lying on the floor reduces or inhibits the habitual effort of carrying the body; movement is organized so that (1) only a small group of muscles is activated, which (2) inhibits their antagonists and lowers habitual contraction thresholds; (3) the full habitual response to gravity is avoided; and (4) the learner acquires a new sensory experience of reduced contraction and improved action quality.

This last point is central to Feldenkrais’s conception of nervous system health and maturity, understood as spontaneous self-regulation. His position becomes clearer when contrasted with Freud—whom he explicitly criticizes for treating social norms as sacrosanct—and with Alexander, whose method relies on conscious inhibition of faulty habits. Feldenkrais argues that as long as conscious control is required to counter habitual proprioceptive impulses, learning remains immature and attention is burdened in a way unknown to fully developed individuals (p. 126).

Feldenkrais’s rejection of voluntary inhibition as a means of behavioral change, together with his strategies for facilitating nervous system reorganization, forms the foundation of his method. Learning, in his view, should occur spontaneously rather than through the domination of unconscious processes by conscious will.

However, adult behavior is already shaped by layers of acquired social and conscious inhibitions—belief systems that play a significant role in learning dynamics. Dealing with these existing inhibitions, and working to disinhibit actions and body parts, is not always possible without conscious involvement.

This raises two key questions: first, what might be gained by “inhibiting inhibition” and involving volition in spontaneous learning; and second, how can this be done without disrupting the unconscious learning processes Feldenkrais emphasized?

Before addressing these questions directly, it is useful to review the ways inhibition is already addressed in the method, both in ATM and F.I.:

Returning to conscious inhibition, we must acknowledge that “old habits die hard.” The emergence of a new option does not automatically eliminate the old one; transition periods are inevitable. In such cases, inhibition can help identify competing patterns or suppressed possibilities.

For example, a client with chronic back pain improved only after recognizing that she habitually pressed her knees together when sitting—a behavior conditioned by her religious upbringing. Awareness of this inhibition did not immediately change the habit, but it clarified the pattern. Similar dynamics occur after trauma, where older patterns persist beneath newer compensations.

Thus, while cortical inhibition alone cannot change behavior, it can support learning by clarifying habits, revealing inhibited patterns, and opening space for observation. Used skillfully, conscious inhibition can restore agency and enhance awareness—provided it is applied at the right moment and supported by the practitioner.